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Mali’s War: The Wages of Sin (Der Lohn der Sünde)

Von Conn Hallinan, Foreign Policy in Focus (englisch) / Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Werner Ruf


“Die Berichte, die aus Mali durchsickern sind erschreckend: Ein junges Paar zu Tode gesteinigt, uralte Heiligtümer zerstört, rd. 365.000 Flüchtlinge, Auspeitschungen wegen der leisesten Verstöße gegen die Sharia ...“ So beginnt Hallinan seine Analyse der Vorgänge in diesem westafrikanischen Land. Die dortige Krise führt er zurück auf die Politik der Bush-Administration, die im Sahel-Raum ein Nest des Terrorismus entdeckt zu haben behauptete und mit ihrer Trans-Saharan Counter Terrrorism Initiative und dann mit der Gründung von des African Command (Africom) am 6. Februar 2007 Mengen von Waffen und Spezialkräfte in die Region brachte. Er verweist auf den bekannten britischen Anthropologen Jeremy Keenan, eine profunden Kenner der Region, um seine These zu stützen, dass es keinen Anhaltspunkt für Terrorismus gab, wohl aber Interessen an den in der Region entdeckten Ölfeldern und vor allem Ängste wegen des Vordringens Chinas in diesem Raum.

Sicherlich gab es in der Region den einen oder anderen (terroristischen) Gewaltakt, doch solche Akte hatten nichts zu tun mit einem internationalen Netzwerk wie al Qaeda. Dieses Etikett werde ohnehin nach Bedarf bestimmten Gruppen zugewiesen oder auch wieder entzogen. In Wirklichkeit hat die Krise in Mali tiefe ethnische (und ökonomische, W.R.) Wurzeln: Die nomadischen Tuareg hatten lange den transsaharischen Handel kontrolliert, hatten lange für mehr Autonomie gekämpft. Der Sturz Gadhafis eröffnete ihnen – wie auch islamistischen Gruppen – die Möglichkeit zu massiver Bewaffnung. Die Tuareg vertreiben die malische Armee aus dem Norden des Landes. Inzwischen terrorisieren Gruppen, die sich islamistisch nennen, die Bevölkerung, sie haben auch die Tuareg weitgehend aus dem Gebiet vertrieben.

Inzwischen brechen über die Region die nicht beabsichtigten Folgen des Krieges gegen Libyen herein. Auch die von den USA ausgebildeten Offiziere der Armeen der Sahel-Länder zeigen nun ihre erworbenen Kompetenzen in Putschen. „Terrorismus“ in Afrika nährt sich aus lokalen Bedingungen, nicht aus einem internationalen jihadistischen Programm. Während Hunderte Millionen Dollar für den Kampf gegen den Terrorismus ausgegeben werden und die USA das Militär dutzender von Staaten der Region ausbilden, ist nicht klar, welche der unzähligen schwelenden Konflikte in der Region noch akut werden können. Aber „Bajonette werden die Quellen von Terrorismus und Instabilität in Afrika nicht austrocknen können! Vielmehr werden militärische Lösungen zur Rekrutierung von Soldaten für Gruppen wie al Qaida im Islamischen Maghreb (AQMI) führen. Afrika braucht nicht mehr Waffen – es braucht Hilfe, Entwicklung und Programme, die wesentliche Teile der Bevölkerung ... aus der Armut herausführen.“

Werner Ruf

Mali’s War: The Wages of Sin

By Conn M. Hallinan *

The reports filtering out of Northern Mali are appalling: a young couple stoned to death, iconic ancient shrines dismantled, and some 365,000 refugees fleeing beatings and whippings for the slightest violations of Sharia law. But the bad dream unfolding in this West African country is less the product of a radical version of Islam than a consequence of the West's scramble for resources on this vast continent, and the wages of sin from the recent Libyan war.

The current crisis gripping northern Mali-an area about the size of France- has its origins in the early years of the Bush Administration, when the U.S. declared the Sahara desert a hotbed of "terrorism" and poured arms and Special Forces into the area as part of the Trans-Sahal Counter Terrorism Initiative. But, according to anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, who has done extensive fieldwork in Mali and the surrounding area, the "terrorism" label had no basis in fact, but was simply designed to "justify the militarization of Africa."

The U.S. military claimed that when the Taliban fell in Afghanistan, terrorists moved west into the Horn of Africa, the Sudan and the Sahara. But Keenan says, "There was absolutely no evidence for that.really a figment of imagination." The real target of enlarging the U.S.'s military footprint was "oil resources" and "the gradually increasing threat of China on the continent."

The U.S. currently receives about 18 percent of its energy supplies from Africa, a figure that is slated to rise to 25 percent by 2015. Africa also provides about one-third of China's energy needs, plus copper, platinum, timber and iron ore. According to the Financial Times, new gas fields were recently discovered on the Algeria-Mali border

There have been terrorist acts in Africa. In 1998, hotels were bombed in Kenya and, in 2002, a synagogue in Tunisia. The 2004 Madrid train bombers were associated with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, an organization that set off bombs in Casablanca in 2003.

But these groups had no affiliation with international terror groups like al-Qaeda, and the only one that could be said to be Sahara-based was the Algerian Salafist Group for Fighting and Preaching. That group later renamed itself "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM).

In 2006, the International Crisis Group also concluded that the Sahara "was not a hotbed of terrorism" and that most North African governments saw the Trans Sahal Initiative as a way to tap into high end arms technology, like attack helicopters, night vision equipment, and sophisticated communications networks.

When the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) was formed in 2008, it took over the Initiative and began working directly with countries in the region, including Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Niger, Mauretania, and Senegal. Indeed, the only country in the region that did not have a tie to AFRICOM was Libya.

The US also has basing agreements with Uganda, Ghana, Namibia, Ghana, Gabon, and Zambia. Some 1500 U.S. Marines are currently deployed at Lemonier, a French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti on the horn of Africa.

The "terrorism" label has always been a slippery one. For instance, the US supported the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia that overthrew the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) government. Washington said the UIC was associated with al- Qaeda, but never produced any evidence of that. The UIC was a moderate Islamic movement that drove out the U.S.-supported warlords and brought peace to Somalia for the first time since 1991. It included such radical Islamic groups as the Shabab, but those organizations did not dominate the government.

The Ethiopian invasion changed all that. For Somalians, Ethiopia is a traditional enemy, and the Shabab succeeded in uniting a large section of the population against the occupation. Thus, a small group that was marginal in the UIC became the backbone of the resistance. "The end result of the US-backed invasion was driving Somalia into the al-Qaeda fold," says Somalia's former foreign minister, Ismaciil Buubaa.

The crisis in Mali has a long history, rooted in the country's deep poverty, on one hand, anda on the other, a push by the Tuaregs-a nomadic Berber people that have long controlled trans-Sahara trade-for greater autonomy and a bigger piece of the development pie. The Tuaregs have staged unsuccessful revolts four times since Mali won its independence from France in 1960, but the fall of Mummer Gaddafi in Libya gave them a golden opportunity.

Gaddfi had long supported the Tuaregs in their war for independence, and many Tuaregs served as pro- government mercenaries in Libya. When Gaddafi fell, a cornucopia of arms opened for the Tuaregs, who quickly put their newly acquired firepower to use against the largely ineffective Malian army.

The so-called "terrorist" groups, like Ansar al-Din, al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad and AQIM, only moved in after the Tuareg Movement for the National Liberation of Azawed had expelled the Malian army from the north and declared a separate country. It is these groups that are stoning people to death, tearing down Sufi shrines, and enforcing rigid Sharia law. The Tuaregs have largely been pushed to the side, and many of them have returned to the desert, abandoning cities like Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal to the Islamic groups.

Besides the original protagonists in northern Mali, there is growing tension between the Islamists and the Songhai, Mali's largest ethnic group. There are rumors that Songhai villages are organizing militia, adding yet another dimension of potential trouble.

None of this had to happen.

When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on Mar. 17 last year, it was to "protect civilians" in Libya. At the time, the 53-member African Union (AU) was attempting to negotiate a political solution to the crisis, but two days after the UN resolution was approved, NATO launched Operation Odyssey that smashed up Gaddafi's air force and armor.

On Mar. 20, the AU met in Mauritania in an effort to stop the fighting. "Our desire," read a joint AU statement "is that Libya's unity and territorial integrity be respected as well as the rejection of any kind of foreign intervention." The AU was acutely aware that Africa's delicate post-colonial borders have enormous potential for creating instability, and that Libya might end up being a falling domino.

"Whatever the motivation of the principle NATO belligerents [in ousting Gadaffi], the law of unintended consequences is exacting a heavy toll on Mali today," former UN regional envoy Robert Fowler told the Guardian (UK) "and will continue to do so throughout the Sahel as the vast store of Libyan weapons spreads across this, one of the most unstable regions of the world."

A decade of growing US military involvement on the continent has not only failed to curb instability and the growth of so-called "terrorist" groups, the US's actions in Somalia and Libya have directly fed the formation of such organizations. And "training" has hardly stabilized things. Indeed, the Mali army captain, Amadou Sanogo, who overthrew the civilian government-the act that led to the Tuareg's successful offensive-was trained by the U.S. military. Sanogo attended the Defense Language Institute in 2005 and 2007, a US Army intelligence program in 2008, and an officer-training course in 2010.

"Terrorism" in Africa is fueled by local conditions, not by an international jihadist agenda. Boko Harum in Nigeria reflects the tension between the poverty of the country's largely Islamic north and its more prosperous Christian south. Similar fault lines run through Niger, Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Terrorism in Algeria and Morocco mirror economies that are unable to provide jobs for a huge swath of their populations, coupled with authoritarian political structures that stifle any attempt to do something about it. Somalia was first a pawn in the Cold War, and then the very definition of chaos. When an Islamic government began taming that chaos, the U.S. overthrew it, unleashing the Shabab.

Hundreds of millions of dollars in aid is being directed at fighting terrorism on the continent, and the US military is training the armed forces of dozens of African nations. A Malian army captain used that aid and training to pull off a coup that now threatens to turn into a regional war.

Will Morocco use U.S. aid to fight terrorism or tighten its grip over the mineral rich Western Sahara and re-ignite its war with the Polisario Front? Will Niger fight "terrorists" or crush Tuareg resistance to French uranium mining in the Sahara? Will Algeria go after the AQIM or its own outlawed Islamist organizations? Will aid to fight terrorism in Nigeria be diverted to smash resistance by local people to oil production in the Niger Delta?

Bayonets won't defeat the source of terrorism and instability in Africa. Indeed, military solutions tend to act as recruiting sergeants for groups like AQIM. Africa doesn't need more weapons, but rather aid, development, and programs that lift a significant section of the continent's population out of poverty.

Source: Foreign Policy in Focus, August 23, 2012; http://www.fpif.org/articles/malis_war_the_wages_of_sin
Foreign Policy in Focus columnist Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedgeblog.wordpress.com and middleempireseries.wordpress.com.

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