Die Welt steht kopf
Polarisierung im Libanon hat sich mit den Wahlen nicht geändert. Hisbollah kritisiert Einmischung der USA
Von Karin Leukefeld, Beirut *
Auch nach den Wahlen im Libanon scheint sich an der Polarisierung des Landes nichts zu ändern. Während das siegreiche Bündnis des 14. März über die Postenverteilung diskutiert und Glückwünsche entgegennimmt, herrscht beim Oppositionsbündnis 8. März große Enttäuschung darüber, daß der greifbar nahe Sieg sich doch in eine Niederlage wandeln konnte. Die Libanesen sind froh, daß niemand zu den Waffen greift, die aufgeheizte Stimmung während des Wahlkampfes hatte Schlimmeres vermuten lassen. Doch sowohl Wahlsieger als auch die Opposition waren offenbar von ihren ausländischen Partnern gedrängt worden, eine militärische Konfrontation in jedem Fall zu vermeiden.
Gleichwohl steht im Libanon die Welt kopf. Was von westlichen Wahlbeobachtern wie dem Carter-Zentrum des früheren US-Präsidenten James Carter, Vertretern der Europäischen Union oder der Carnegie-Stiftung als »Sieg der libanesischen Demokratie und saubere Wahlen mit kleineren Schönheitsfehlern« gelobt wird, ist alles andere als »demokratisch«. Die Gründe für den Wahlsieg des 14. März, dem sogenannten Mehrheitsbündnis, liegen im Wahlsystem, in massiver Einflußnahme des Auslands und Bestechung der Wähler. Selbstkritisch räumen Unterstützer des Oppositionsbündnisses ein, daß positive Umfrageergebnisse vor allem die Freie Patriotische Bewegung (FPM) von Michel Aoun leichtsinnig gemacht hätten; der Wahlkampf sei nicht intensiv genug geführt worden. Aoun gilt als erster Verlierer der Wahlen, auch wenn er die Anzahl der Parlamentssitze um sieben Mandate ausbauen konnte.
Das Bündnis um Saad Hariri und seine Zukunftsbewegung hat die Wahlen gewonnen, erhielt aber nur rund 46 Prozent der Stimmen (knapp 700000). 54 Prozent der Wähler (mehr als 800000) stimmten für das Oppositionsbündnis 8. März, das damit deutlich die Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen konnte. Daß es dennoch als Verlierer aus den Wahlen ging, liegt am libanesischen Wahlsystem, bei dem nicht die einzelne Stimme eines Wahlberechtigten zählt, sondern die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Wahlbezirk, dem nach einem konfessionellen Schlüssel eine bestimmte Anzahl von Mandaten zusteht. Dieser Schlüssel begünstigt Christen und sunnitische Muslime, benachteiligt aber die schiitischen Muslime. So stehen den beiden Wahlbezirken Baalbek-Hermel und Beirut (3) jeweils zehn Mandate im Parlament zu. Während die zehn Abgeordneten des 8. März in dem schiitisch-muslimisch dominierten Wahlbezirk Baalbek-Hermel ínsgesamt 255000 Stimmen erhielten, schafften es die zehn Kandidaten des 14. März im Wahlbezirk Beirut (3) schon mit 103000 Stimmen, weniger als der Hälfte.
Hisbollahführer Hassan Nasrallah akzeptierte zwar das Wahlergebnis »in sportlicher Manier«, kritisierte aber massiv die Einmischung der US-Administration im Vorfeld der Wahlen. US-Vizepräsident Biden hatte ebenso wie US-Außenministerin Hillary Clinton kurz vor den Wahlen Vertreter des 14. März in Beirut getroffen und erklärt, die USA werde im Falle eines Wahlsieges der Hisbollah ihre finanzielle Hilfe für das Land neu prüfen müssen. Mit großem finanziellen Aufwand hatten beide Seiten zwar Auslandslibanesen eingeflogen, doch war der 14. März hier erheblich finanzkräftiger und erfolgreicher als die Hisbollah und konnte so selbst in kritischen Bezirken das Ergebnis deutlich zu den eigenen Gunsten verändern. In Zahle, einem traditionell der Opposition zugeneigten Bezirk, hatten sich in den letzten Monaten rund 12 000 sunnitische Wähler neu angemeldet, die alle für die Liste des 14. März stimmten, ein Vorgehen, das ein juristisches Nachspiel haben wird. Zudem hatten Kandidaten des 14. März massiv vor einem neuen Krieg mit Israel gewarnt, sollte die Opposition die Wahl gewinnen. Das dürfte viele Libanesen eingeschüchtert haben, vermuten libanesische Analysten.
* Aus: junge Welt, 13. Juni 2009
Obama Wins an Election in the Middle East
Lebanon's voters gave the White House the victory it wanted -- with a lot of help from Hezbollah.
By Juan Cole **
June 10, 2009 | President Barack Obama's speech in
Cairo last Thursday may already have borne fruit. His
call for political moderates in the Muslim world to
fight extremism may have helped tip the weekend's
parliamentary elections in Lebanon to the anti-Syrian
March 14 Alliance. Obama did not explicitly call for
the defeat of Hezbollah in the elections, but the
Lebanese already knew where the administration's
sympathies lay. His speech came three weeks after a
Beirut visit by Vice President Joe Biden in which Biden
warned at a news conference, "We will evaluate the
shape of our assistance programs based on the
composition of the new government and the policies it
advocates."
Whatever the size of Obama's influence, the election
has already had a direct impact of the future of Arab-
Israeli negotiations and on the realization of U.S.
aims in the region. A Hezbollah win would have
strengthened the case made by the right-wing Israeli
Likud Party that Iran and its proxies are a higher
priority for Israel's foreign policy than trying to
restart the peace process with the Palestinians. For
Americans and the rest of the world, the Lebanese
elections were about whether Iran would be strengthened
or weakened in the Levant, and whether Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would have a new pretext
for intransigence. The answer to both questions was a
resounding no.
But while the consequences may have been global, the
politics, as always, were local. Even before Biden's
visit and Obama's speech, most of the Lebanese public
had probably already made up its mind about the
arrogant and presumptuous Hezbollah-dominated
opposition. The March 14 Alliance won because of the
strength of the local economy, the desire for tourism,
and anger at Hezbollah for streetfighting in 2008 that
left 11 dead, more than a year of protests and sit-ins,
and the Hezbollah bloc's ultimately successful attempt
to strong-arm its way to effective veto power in the
government.
Lebanon, where no one religious sect can claim a
majority, is a small pond with a handful of big frogs
in it. The chief power broker since 2005 has been the
dapper, goateed Saad Hariri, son of slain
multibillionaire and former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri, who was assassinated in February 2005. Saad
Hariri will now become prime minister. The Hariris,
Sunni Muslims, made their pile in Saudi Arabia and are
close to the royal family there. This political dynasty
stands for Arab cosmopolitanism and represents the
urban, upwardly mobile Sunni middle classes (Sunnis are
just over a quarter of the Lebanese population, Shiites
at least a third).
Hariri believes that his father was assassinated at
Syrian behest, and he led the successful movement to
expel Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 (his alliance
is named for the date of the massive anti-Syrian
demonstrations called the Cedar Revolution). He
therefore takes a dim view of the Shiite Hezbollah
Party, which continues to be allied with Syria and with
Shiite Iran. Although Hariri is often called "pro-
Western," his closest ties are with Riyadh, and some of
his supporters are Sunni fundamentalists who, while
anti-Iran, are not exactly fans of Washington either.
Critics charge that Saudi Arabia poured money into
Lebanon to ensure the victory of Hariri and his
partners, and that thousands of Sunni Lebanese
expatriates were flown back to vote in key districts.
Hariri is allied with Samir Geagea, an old-time
Christian guerrilla warrior, whose Lebanese Forces
Party did better than expected, though among its
Maronite Christian base it remains a minority taste.
Hariri is also allied with Walid Jumblatt, head of the
Progressive Socialist Party and warlord of the Druze,
an offshoot of Islam that accounts for under 10 percent
of Lebanon's population. The new government thus
represents key Lebanese constituents, and especially
the urban middle classes and entrepreneurs that are
suspicious of neighboring Syria's ponderous one-party
state and of its fundamentalist Shiite Iranian backer.
Because of his coalition, Hariri manages to receive
support simultaneously from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf,
from Lebanon's old colonial patron France, and from the
United States.
Hariri and his coalition squared off against Hasan
Nasrallah, the shrewd leader of Hezbollah, and his ally
Gen. Michel Aoun. Nasrallah had garnered substantial
popularity in Lebanon, having spearheaded the effort to
end Israel's occupation of the south of the country,
and then having successfully withstood an Israeli
invasion in 2006. But by then he had already split with
the March 14 Alliance, with whom he had cooperated in
2005, and forged a tie with Aoun. He then overreached
in May of 2008, when he came into conflict with the
government over his ability to monitor comings and
goings at Beirut's airport, which Hariri wanted to cut
off. Nasrallah sent his Hezbollah fighters into the
streets of the capital and thus forced the government
to back down on the airport surveillance issue.
This move was a temporary success, but it may have been
a strategic failure. For the first time, Hezbollah had
turned its arms on other Lebanese, something Nasrallah
had earlier pledged never to do, and he deeply harmed
the popularity of his movement among Christians and
Sunnis. Blind to this change in how he is perceived, he
even went so far as to boast in May of this year that
the Beirut takeover had been a "glorious moment."
At the same time, Aoun undermined himself with his own
Christian constituency by picking fights with the
Maronite Catholic patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir, as well
as with Gen. Michel Suleiman, the Christian president
who had headed the armed forces. He was also seen as
far too close to Damascus. Lebanese Christians still
cling to the church, the army and the presidency as key
elements in their political identity and solidarity,
and Aoun had attempted to undermine all three. In the
weekend's elections, his Free Patriotic Movement upped
its representation in Parliament from 21 to 27 seats,
but its support among Lebanon's Christian electorate
slipped from its 2005 figure of 70 percent.
In some ways, the victory of the ruling March 14
Alliance is a public vote of confidence in the Lebanese
economy, which has largely avoided the fallout of the
global downturn and is on track to grow 6 percent this
year. Lebanese banks adopted conservative lending and
investment policies as a result of the economic
meltdown during the 1975-1989 civil war, and legions of
Lebanese expatriates and Gulf investors assure bank
liquidity and a hot real estate market. The Lebanese
tourist market is potentially huge, but it has been
devastated in recent years by Israel's attack and then
by faction fighting between Hariri's supporters and
Hezbollah militiamen.
With the victory of March 14 Alliance, many Lebanese
are hoping for a bumper crop of tourists and music
festivals. Despite Europe's economic doldrums, nearly
half a million tourists went to Lebanon in the first
quarter of 2009, up over 50 percent from the previous
year, and tourism revenues this year could come to $2.5
billion, some 10 percent of the gross national product.
Hezbollah prospered for years by offering the Lebanese
an effective means of resistance to Israeli
encroachments and by allowing them to hold their heads
up high. Even Christians and Sunnis supported Nasrallah
during the Israeli attack in 2006. But once he turned
his guns on his own countrymen, he transformed himself
from a symbol of Lebanese pride into a source of
oppression and humiliation. Above all, this election
was a referendum on which policies would lead to peace
and prosperity. Whether they had their eye on Biden's
stick or on Obama's carrot, the Lebanese voters made it
clear that they did not believe Nasrallah could
deliver. It's Obama's time in Beirut, not Khamenei's,
and the president now has one less obstacle to face in
his pursuit of peace in the region.
** www.salon.com
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