Angriffsgründe gesucht
Neue Spekulationen über einen Militärschlag gegen Teheran. Geheime CIA-Studie findet keine Beweise für ein iranisches Atomwaffenprogramm - Auszüge aus einem Artikel von Seymour Hersh
Von Knut Mellenthin *
Insider im Regierungsapparat der USA rechnen mit einem Angriff auf den Iran noch während der Amtszeit von Präsident George W. Bush, die Ende 2008 abläuft. Das berichtet der bekannte US-amerikanische Journalist Seymour M. Hersh in der neuen Ausgabe des Magazins The New Yorker. Hersh wurde zuletzt im Mai 2004 weltweit bekannt durch seine Enthüllungen über die Folterpraktiken der USA im irakischen Gefängnis Abu Ghraib. Bereits 1969 hatte er mit der Aufdeckung des Massakers im vietnamesischen Dorf My Lai (Son My) und mit Artikeln über die chemische Kriegführung der USA Aufsehen erregt.
In seinem neuen Artikel geht Hersh der Frage nach, ob die Wahlniederlage der Republikaner und die damit verbundene Schwächung ihrer Regierung einen Angriff auf den Iran wahrscheinlicher oder unwahrscheinlicher macht. Die ausführliche Analyse stützt sich auf zahlreiche Gespräche mit Insidern des Regierungsapparats, von denen viele Wert auf Wahrung ihrer Anonymität gelegt haben. Hersh kommt zur Schlußfolgerung, daß maßgebliche Kräfte im Stab von Vizepräsident Richard Cheney und im Pentagon auf einen Angriff drängen. Ein Hauptziel dieser Kräfte sei es, angesichts des Desasters im Irak »ein Signal auszusenden, daß Amerika immer noch seine Ziele erreichen kann«. »Auch wenn dabei Irans atomares Netzwerk nicht zerstört werden kann, gibt es dennoch viele, die glauben, daß ein 36stündiges Bombardement der einzige Weg sei, den Iranern die hohen Kosten weiterer Arbeiten an der Bombe und der Unterstützung pro-iranischer Elemente im Irak deutlich zu machen«, zitiert Hersh einen anonymen Regierungsberater.
Gerade die verfahrene Lage im Irak könne jenen Kräften als Argument dienen, die den Krieg möglichst bald auf den Iran ausdehnen wollen, schreibt Hersh. »Mehr und mehr Leute (im Regierungsapparat) glauben, daß eine Schwächung Irans der einzige Weg ist, um Irak zu retten.« Auf wenig Sympathie im Weißen Haus sei daher eine hochgeheime Analyse des Geheimdienstes CIA gestoßen, die zum Ergebnis kommt, daß es keine schlüssigen Beweise für ein iranisches Atomwaffenprogramm gebe. Die Regierung suche keine Beweise, zitiert Hersh einen früheren hochrangigen Geheimdienstmann, sondern wolle Gründe für einen Angriff geliefert bekommen. Auch der Pentagon-Geheimdienst DIA, traditionell mit der CIA in heftige Konkurrenzkämpfe verstrickt, stelle deren Analyse in Frage.
Auf der anderen Seite dränge Israel sehr stark auf Militäraktionen, schreibt Hersh. Die Israelis hätten aber zugesagt, »nichts auf eigene Faust zu unternehmen, ohne sich vorher bei uns grünes Licht zu holen«, zitiert Hersh einen Pentagon-Berater. Ein zweischneidiges Versprechen, denn damit wäre völlig eindeutig, daß jede israelische Aktion gegen Iran mit den USA abgesprochen ist.
Am Montag nahm die israelische Tageszeitung Haaretz den Hersh-Artikel zum Anlaß, um an eine – offiziell nicht bestätigte – Äußerung von Bush gegenüber Jacques Chirac vor einigen Wochen zu erinnern. Beim Besuch des französischen Präsidenten in Washington soll Bush gesagt haben, man könne die Möglichkeit eines israelischen »Präventivschlags« nicht ausschließen. Er habe dann hinzugefügt: Falls das geschähe, würde er Verständnis dafür haben.
Haaretz schreibt weiter, daß französische Regierungsbeamte im Gespräch mit israelischen Partnern kürzlich die Einschätzung geäußert hätten, das iranische Atomprogramm könne im Frühjahr 2007 den »point of no return« erreichen. Gemeint ist der Zeitpunkt, wo Iran rein theoretisch das nötige technische Wissen zum Bau einer Atombombe besitzen könnte. Für israelische Militärs und Politiker bezeichnet der »point of no return« den letztmöglichen Zeitpunkt für einen Militärschlag gegen den Iran.
* Aus: junge Welt, 21. November 2006
D O K U M E N T A T I O N - Auszüge aus dem Artikel von Seymour Hersh im "New Yorker"
THE NEXT ACT
Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Issue of 2006-11-27
Posted 2006-11-20
www.newyorker.com
A month before the November elections, Vice-President
Dick Cheney was sitting in on a national-security
discussion at the Executive Office Building. The talk
took a political turn: what if the Democrats won both
the Senate and the House? How would that affect policy
toward Iran, which is believed to be on the verge of
becoming a nuclear power? At that point, according to
someone familiar with the discussion, Cheney began
reminiscing about his job as a lineman, in the early
nineteen-sixties, for a power company in Wyoming.
Copper wire was expensive, and the linemen were
instructed to return all unused pieces three feet or
longer. No one wanted to deal with the paperwork that
resulted, Cheney said, so he and his colleagues found a
solution: putting "shorteners" on the wire--that is,
cutting it into short pieces and tossing the leftovers
at the end of the workday. If the Democrats won on
November 7th, the Vice-President said, that victory
would not stop the Administration from pursuing a
military option with Iran. The White House would put
"shorteners" on any legislative restrictions, Cheney
said, and thus stop Congress from getting in its way.
The White House's concern was not that the Democrats
would cut off funds for the war in Iraq but that future
legislation would prohibit it from financing operations
targeted at overthrowing or destabilizing the Iranian
government, to keep it from getting the bomb. "They're
afraid that Congress is going to vote a binding
resolution to stop a hit on Iran, Ã la Nicaragua in the
Contra war," a former senior intelligence official told
me.
(...)
In interviews, current and former Administration
officials returned to one question: whether Cheney
would be as influential in the last two years of George
W. Bush's Presidency as he was in its first six. Cheney
is emphatic about Iraq. In late October, he told Time,
"I know what the President thinks," about Iraq. "I know
what I think. And we're not looking for an exit
strategy. We're looking for victory." He is equally
clear that the Administration would, if necessary, use
force against Iran. "The United States is keeping all
options on the table in addressing the irresponsible
conduct of the regime," he told an Israeli lobbying
group early this year. "And we join other nations in
sending that regime a clear message: we will not allow
Iran to have a nuclear weapon."
On November 8th, the day after the Republicans lost
both the House and the Senate, Bush announced the
resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and the nomination of his successor, Robert Gates, a
former director of Central Intelligence. The move was
widely seen as an acknowledgment that the
Administration was paying a political price for the
debacle in Iraq. Gates was a member of the Iraq Study
Group--headed by former Secretary of State James Baker
and Lee Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman--
which has been charged with examining new approaches to
Iraq, and he has publicly urged for more than a year
that the U.S. begin direct talks with Iran. President
Bush's decision to turn to Gates was a sign of the
White House's "desperation," a former high-level C.I.A.
official, who worked with the White House after
September 11th, told me. Cheney's relationship with
Rumsfeld was among the closest inside the
Administration, and Gates's nomination was seen by some
Republicans as a clear signal that the Vice-President's
influence in the White House could be challenged. The
only reason Gates would take the job, after turning
down an earlier offer to serve as the new Director of
National Intelligence, the former high-level C.I.A.
official said, was that "the President's father, Brent
Scowcroft, and James Baker"--former aides of the first
President Bush--"piled on, and the President finally
had to accept adult supervision."
Critical decisions will be made in the next few months,
the former C.I.A. official said. "Bush has followed
Cheney's advice for six years, and the story line will
be: ‘Will he continue to choose Cheney over his
father?' We'll know soon." (The White House and the
Pentagon declined to respond to detailed requests for
comment about this article, other than to say that
there were unspecified inaccuracies.)
A retired four-star general who worked closely with the
first Bush Administration told me that the Gates
nomination means that Scowcroft, Baker, the elder Bush,
and his son "are saying that winning the election in
2008 is more important than the individual. The issue
for them is how to preserve the Republican agenda. The
Old Guard wants to isolate Cheney and give their girl,
Condoleezza Rice"--the Secretary of State--"a chance to
perform." The combination of Scowcroft, Baker, and the
senior Bush working together is, the general added,
"tough enough to take on Cheney. One guy can't do it."
Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State in
Bush's first term, told me that he believed the
Democratic election victory, followed by Rumsfeld's
dismissal, meant that the Administration "has backed
off," in terms of the pace of its planning for a
military campaign against Iran. Gates and other
decision-makers would now have more time to push for a
diplomatic solution in Iran and deal with other,
arguably more immediate issues. "Iraq is as bad as it
looks, and Afghanistan is worse than it looks,"
Armitage said. "A year ago, the Taliban were fighting
us in units of eight to twelve, and now they're
sometimes in company-size, and even larger." Bombing
Iran and expecting the Iranian public "to rise up" and
overthrow the government, as some in the White House
believe, Armitage added, "is a fool's errand."
"Iraq is the disaster we have to get rid of, and Iran
is the disaster we have to avoid," Joseph Cirincione,
the vice-president for national security at the liberal
Center for American Progress, said. "Gates will be in
favor of talking to Iran and listening to the advice of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the neoconservatives are
still there"--in the White House--"and still believe
that chaos would be a small price for getting rid of
the threat. The danger is that Gates could be the new
Colin Powell--the one who opposes the policy but ends
up briefing the Congress and publicly supporting it."
Other sources close to the Bush family said that the
machinations behind Rumsfeld's resignation and the
Gates nomination were complex, and the seeming triumph
of the Old Guard may be illusory. The former senior
intelligence official, who once worked closely with
Gates and with the President's father, said that Bush
and his immediate advisers in the White House
understood by mid-October that Rumsfeld would have to
resign if the result of the midterm election was a
resounding defeat. Rumsfeld was involved in
conversations about the timing of his departure with
Cheney, Gates, and the President before the election,
the former senior intelligence official said. Critics
who asked why Rumsfeld wasn't fired earlier, a move
that might have given the Republicans a boost, were
missing the point. "A week before the election, the
Republicans were saying that a Democratic victory was
the seed of American retreat, and now Bush and Cheney
are going to change their national-security policies?"
the former senior intelligence official said. "Cheney
knew this was coming. Dropping Rummy after the election
looked like a conciliatory move--‘You're right,
Democrats. We got a new guy and we're looking at all
the options. Nothing is ruled out.' " But the
conciliatory gesture would not be accompanied by a
significant change in policy; instead, the White House
saw Gates as someone who would have the credibility to
help it stay the course on Iran and Iraq. Gates would
also be an asset before Congress. If the Administration
needed to make the case that Iran's weapons program
posed an imminent threat, Gates would be a better
advocate than someone who had been associated with the
flawed intelligence about Iraq. The former official
said, "He's not the guy who told us there were weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq, and he'll be taken
seriously by Congress."
Once Gates is installed at the Pentagon, he will have
to contend with Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Rumsfeld
legacy--and Dick Cheney. A former senior Bush
Administration official, who has also worked with
Gates, told me that Gates was well aware of the
difficulties of his new job. He added that Gates would
not simply endorse the Administration's policies and
say, "with a flag waving, ‘Go, go' "--especially at the
cost of his own reputation. "He does not want to see
thirty-five years of government service go out the
window," the former official said. However, on the
question of whether Gates would actively stand up to
Cheney, the former official said, after a pause, "I
don't know."
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